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ABSTRACT 
The Space Stat ion,  a permanently-inhabited o r b i t i n g  laboratory,  places new 
demands on spacecraft f i r e  safety. 
constrained f i r e  controls,  but  t he  a c c e s s i b i l i t y  o f  t he  Space S t a t i o n  t o  a 
v a r i e t y  o f  users may c a l l  f o r  l e s s - r e s t r i c t i v e  measures. This paper discusses 
f i r e  safety  issues through a review o f  the s t a t e  o f  t he  a r t  and a presentat ion 
o f  key f i nd ings  from a recent NASA Lewis Research Center workshop. The sub- 
j e c t s  covered are the  fundamental science o f  low-gravi ty combustion and the 
technology advances I n  f i r e  detection, extinguishment, ma te r ia l s  assessment, 
and atmosphere select ion.  Key concerns are f o r  the adoption o f  a f i r e - s a f e  
atmosphere and the  s u b s t i t u t i o n  f o r  the e f f e c t i v e  but t o x i c  ext inguishant,  
Halon 1301. The f i r e  safety  studies and reviews provide several recommenda- 
t i o n s  f o r  f u r t h e r  act ion.  One i s  the expanded research i n  combustion, sensors* 
and ma te r ia l s  i n  the low-gravi ty environment o f  space. Another i s  t he  develop- 
ment o f  general ized f i r e - s a f e t y  standards f o r  spacecraft through cooperative 
endeavors w i t h  aerospace and outside Government and indus t r y  sources. 
Long-duration missions may c a l l  f o r  more- 
INTRODUCTION 
F i r e  safety  has always had a top p r i o r i t y  i n  the  planning and operat ion 
o f  human spacef l ight  missions. 
i nhab i ted  o r b i t i n g  f a c i l j t y ,  the NASA Space Stat ion,  new issues o f  f i r e  safety  
must be addressed ( r e f s .  1 and 2). The Space S ta t i on  w i l l  accommodate a crew 
o f  various s k i l l s  engaged i n  construction and maintenance, s c i e n t i f i c  exper i -  
ments, and commercial technology development. 
f o r  a long t ime ,  i n v o l v i n g  periods o f  ord inary l i v i n g ,  housekeeping, and 
rec rea t i ona l  a c t i v i t i e s .  
community, w i t h  the hope o f  rescue many days away. Thus, the Space S ta t i on  
may c a l l  f o r  improved and innovative f i r e  safety s t ra teg ies,  as compared t o  
previous space f l i g h t  programs. 
Space S ta t i on  as accessible as possible t o  a v a r i e t y  o f  users. 
f i r e  safety measures must s t r i v e  for s i m p l i c i t y ,  f l e x i b i l i t y ,  general izat ion,  
and cos t  ef fect iveness, wi thout  compromising human o r  s t r u c t u r a l  safety 
c r i t e r i a .  
W i t h  designs underway f o r  a permanently- 
The crew w i l l  remain on l o c a t i o n  
The Space S ta t i on  must se rve  as a sel f -contained 
On the other hand, i t  i s  important t o  make the  
Accordingly, 
A symposium-workshop held a t  the  NASA Lewis on August 20-21, 1986, d i s -  
cussed the  needs o f  f u tu re  spacecraft f i r e  safety.  
t h i s  workshop w i l l  not  be ava i l ab le  a t  the t ime o f  presentat ion o f  t h i s  paper. 
The purposes o f  t h i s  paper are both t o  explore the f i r e  safety  issues t h a t  l e d  
The published f i nd ings  o f  
*Member A I A A  
~ 
to the organization of the workshop and to review the preliminary recomnenda- 
tions reached by consensus of the workshop participants. 
The organlzatlon of this paper covers, first, a general review of the 
criteria for and the historical approaches to spacecraft fire safety. 
pertinent scientific and technological issues are presented. Fundamental 
science Involves, foremost, the subject of microgravity combustion. 
includes applications to fire detection, extinguishment, material assessment, 
and spacecraft atmosphere selection. 
tion products and inert atmospheres are also reviewed briefly. 
paper discusses application and testing in the Space Station. 
Then the 
Technology 
Tolerances of human responses to combus- 
Finally, the 
BACKGROUND OF SPACECRAFT FIRE SAFETY CONCERNS 
Fire Safety Criteria 
Fire, as defined here, is destructive burning. It is the uncontrolled 
form of combustion, which is a rapid oxidation reaction often useful in energy 
transfer operations. Safety, of course, is never absolute. What is sought in 
safety procedures Is the minimization of risk, or the potential for harm. 
While the broad subject of fire risk analysis cannot be covered in this paper, 
the technical literature contains thorough reviews of fire risk surveys and 
predictions. Those appearing in the American Society for Testing and Materials 
(ASTM) publications are good examples (refs. 3 and 4). 
The familiar fire triangle of fuel, ignition, and oxygen (fig. 1 )  is a 
The chart lists examples of each of these elements as they apply to 
simplified description of the ingredients that must be present for fire to 
occur. 
spacecraft. Ideally, fire can be prevented if one or more of the fire-triangle 
elements is removed. This is a fire defense strategy characterized by Raasch, 
Percy, and Rockoff (ref. 5) as DESIGN TO PRECLUDE. This strategy could involve 
ignition source controls (grounding for example), exclusive use of nonflammable 
materials, or inert atmospheres (oxygen-deficient atmospheres). For long- 
duration missions in the Space Station, one cannot depend on the continuous 
preclusion of any of the fire elements. For example, ignition sources may 
occur unpredictably; most materials have some degree of flammability; and, of 
course, human habttation implies the presence of an oxidizing atmosphere. The 
second line of fire defense described by Raasch, et al. is DESIGN TO CONTROL. 
This is the more practical strategy assumed for present-generation spacecraft. 
The criteria for this defense may be paraphrased as: 
(1) An ignition source will always exist, and a fire can start. 
(2) A fire must be self limiting within a short distance from its ignition 
point. 
(3) Exposed materials shall be self extinguishing either inherently or in 
configuration; that is, by limitation of the amount, spacing, or accessibility 
of the materials. 
Point 1, while implying that safe ignition-free practices should be 
followed, concedes that ignition can occur. Point 2 stresses the concept of 
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fire-resistant materials (limited flame spread) rather than absolute nonflam- 
mability. Point 3 acknowledges that, if materials are used that are not 
inherently fire resistant (paper, clothing, for example), they are to be made 
self-extinguishing or controlled through configuration measures or containment. 
With respect to the fire triangle, the control strategy is to assume ignition 
and oxygen but to limit the availability of fuel. Certain interesting proposi- 
tions for limiting oxygen are discussed later in this paper. 
Historical Approaches to Spacecraft Fire Safety 
Human-crew macecraft experience. - The first two United States human-crew 
spacecraft projects, Mercury and Gemini, incorporated fire safety by the use 
of state-of-the-art nonflamnable materials. For reasons of structural limita- 
tions and control simplicity, the atmosphere was 100-percent oxygen at 35 kPa 
(5 psia) total pressure. Detection of fires was the responsibility of the 
astronauts, who had drinking water available for extinguishment of incipient 
fires. 
Fire hazards In the early space flights were reviewed thoroughly by Roth 
(ref. 6). The increased fire risks in the 100-percent oxygen atmosphere were 
recognized, although Roth felt that safe practices could prevent the possibil- 
ity of ignitions. The tragic Apollo 204 fire in 1967 occurred during a train- 
ing session with the atmosphere of 100-percent oxygen at over 110 kPa (1 atm) 
total pressure. The investigation of the Apollo fire led to many reviews of 
safe practices, including analytical studies of fire growth by Huggett (ref. 7) 
and Botteri (ref. 8) and assessments of material flammability by Kimzey 
(ref. 9). 
dual-gas atmosphere, 60 percent oxygen-40 percent nitrogen, which was consid- 
ered adequate for fire safety at atmospheric pressures (refs. 10 and 11). 
For the Apollo project, subsequent launch pad operations used a 
The next series of human-crew space flights represented a second genera- 
Skylab, which used Apollo tion of more complex vehicles, with larger crews. 
and Saturn vehicle components, was the first United States human-crew space 
outpost, a primitive forerunner of the NASA Space Station. 
tation System Orbiter (Shuttle) is the present-operation human-crew system, 
designed for sustained orbital flights of several weeks and accommodating up 
to eight persons. The normal spacecraft atmospheres are now oxygen-nitrogen 
mixtures identical to earth sea-level compositions at sea-level pressures. The 
exception to this is the enriched-oxygen atmosphere required prior to extra- 
vehicular activities. No longer are fire detection and extinguishment the sole 
responsibility of flight crews. 
portable fire extinguishers for both automatic and manual fire control. 
The Space Transpor- 
The Orbiter has smoke detectors and fixed and 
Fire safety standards and revlews. - Criteria for spacecraft material 
testing and acceptance relative to fire safety were first established through 
the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center (now the Lyndon 8. Johnson Space Center) 
(refs. 12 and 13). Testing was formalized into deslgn/development tests and 
qualification tests. The qualification requirements provided the impetus for 
the formulation of a new generation o f  fire-resistance polymers. 
were presented in a scientific conference, the Conference on Materials for 
Improved Fire Safety, on May 6-7, 1970 (ref. 14). Two years later, discussion 
of the advances in spacecraft fire detection and atmospheres were included in 
the Symposium on Space Simulation (ref. 15). More recently, the Conference on 
Early results 
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materials 'for aircraft applications, but the papers on combustion toxicology 
and fire models have results partially applicable to spacecraft (ref. 16). 
The present NASA materials acceptance handbook (ref. 17), NHB 8060.16, 
originated in February 1974, and it is now in its second updated version of 
September 1981. The handbook is again being revised and updated. The purpose 
of this handbook is to present uniform requirements for materials in habitable 
areas of spacecraft. 
ments in the handbook that are applicable to fire safety. 
grouped in two categories, Group I being those that are noncombustible or self- 
extinguishing on the basis of an upward propagation test, and Group I1 bejng 
all other materials. The handbook defines material selection through nine 
categories of material usage and 16 test procedures. Group I1 materials are 
normally approved only in controlled containment. These materials must be 
assessed by less-stringent downward propagation, flash, and fire point tests. 
All the requirements in the "€9 8060.16 are based on a ground-level atmospheric 
pressure and normal gravity, except for tests at higher pressures on materials 
for high-pressure oxygen service. 
associated with many activities related to fire safety, including aircraft 
crash-fire prevention, low-gravity flamnability, and safety analyses by the 
former Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute. Studies relevant to 
spacecraft fire safety were generally conducted on a consulting basis, rather 
than as continuing, systematic projects. NASA Lewis skills in low-gravity 
studies and the participation in the Reduced Gravity Combustion Working Group 
(now the Microgravity Combustion Science Discipline Working Group) attracted 
outside attention concerned with spacecraft fire safety. 
NASA Johnson Space Center asked the Lewis Research Center to investigate two 
serious fire-related problems: 
Table I Is a condensation of the material test require- 
Materials are 
I NASA Lewis Research Center fire safety involvement. - NASA Lewis has been 
In October 1983, the 
(1) The fire hazards posed by the spacecraft atmosphere of 40 percent 
oxygen (now 30 percent) required for the 12- to 24-hr preconditioning in the 
main cabin prior to an extravehicular activity. 
(2) The toxicity of Halon 1301 (a fire extinguishant) and its degradation 
products. 
This request led to a formal review and a workshop at the NASA Johnson 
Space Center in March 1984. 
to those concerned with low-gravity combustion, fire control, and medical 
science. The workshop findings were informal and unpublished. However, the 
recomnendations for further inquiry into selected fire-safety topics, impelled 
by the needs of the developing Space Station program, stimulated the organiza- 
tion of a second workshop. 
Fire Safety Workshop, was held at the NASA Lewis on August 20-21, 1986. 
The workshop expanded the fire-related questions 
This widely-attended meeting, the NASA Spacecraft 
Table I1 summarizes the contents of  this workshop, showing the titles and 
The first portion was a symposium of ten papers 
The second portion of the workshop was five simultane- 
authors of the presentations. 
that reviewed fundamental knowledge and fire-control standards and their appli- 
cations to spacecraft. 
ous discussion forums designed to elicit comments from the participants and 
recomnendations for further study. This paper, to a large extent, covers the 
findings of the workshop forums. 
Spacecraft Fire Safety Study Logic 
Figure 2 shows the relationship of the projected needs for spacecraft fire 
safety studies. The chart is a necessary, if obvious, Illustration of the 
steps for such a program. The initial analysis identifies needs, determines 
acceptable risks, and assesses the extent of present knowledge. This informa- 
tion is applied to guide fundamental and applied research, particularly in 
combustion, heat transfer, sensors, and material properties. The scientific 
knowledge can then be used for two purposes: 
technology and hardware, as, for example, in fire detection and extinguishment; 
the other, the compilation of information in data banks and in standards for 
materials and methods. The workshop recommendations provide an alternative 
Input for systems analysis, defining needs for both fundamental research and 
technology development. Finally, the goal of the program is towards fire 
safety in the Space Station and later advanced space systems. It is also 
Important to recognize that the Space Station itself provides a unique test 
facility to verify and perfect technology for future evolutionary versions of 
the Station. 
one, the development of applied 
MICROGRAVITY.COMBUSTION SCIENCE 
Introduction 
Basic science relevant to fire safety encompasses many fields, includtng 
oxidative reactions, kinetics, heat transfer, mass transfer, radiation, and 
others. This paper will focus on a review of combustion in low gravity (micro- 
gravity), since this process is uniquely associated with the space environment. 
Microgravity Analyses 
One is generally aware that "zero gravity" is a misnomer for most space 
flights. 
orbiting spacecraft, the earth gravitational force is nearly the same as that 
at sea level. The condition of the spacecraft and its contents is that of free 
fall, experiencing a balance of forces with a very low net acceleration force. 
Zero acceleration, or zero gravity, is approached only as a limit. There are 
always some unbalanced drag forces and internal perturbations from the human 
occupants. 
gravity, terms used here interchangeably. 
At the usual altitude of a few hundred kilometers for human-crew 
Thus the space environment is properly called low gravity or micro- 
For over 30 years, limited studies have been conducted under experimental 
conditions of microgravity. 
management for spacecraft propulsion systems. More recently, studies have 
expanded to cover the use of microgravlty environments for advancements In 
material processing and separations. For combustion research, the microgravity 
environment has also been recognized as a means of eliminating buoyancy forces 
and the resulting convective flows, thus isolating the effects of other forces, 
namely pressure, inertia, viscosity, and surface tension. The application o f  
the results of such studies to spacecraft fire safety becomes a useful corol- 
lary effort. 
The major application has been toward fluid 
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Early studies have modeled the low-gravity flame as a thick sphere, in 
contrast to the thin, candle-shaped diffusion flame observed under normal 
gravity (refs. 18 and 19). Other analyses predicted flame length and width 
from diffusion and momentum balances, for Comparison to experimental results 
(refs. 20 and 21). Most low-gravity combustion research to date relevant to 
fire safety, however, consists of empirical observations. 
Microgravity Experiments 
The microgravity environment is distinguished by the absence of buoyancy 
forces and natural convection. These conditions may be simulated by several 
means. A simple technique is to eliminate buoyancy by balancing the densities 
of the gaseous components. Dosanjh, in a study of smoldering (flameless) com- 
bustion of a porous material, regulated the oxidant pressure to minimize gas 
density differences (ref. 22). Another technique is to increase gravitational 
acceleration by mounting the experiment on a centrifuge and then to apply 
dimensional analysis to extrapolate the variable acceleration to microgravity 
(ref. 23). For fire-safety studies, the most common technique is free fall. 
Free-fall systems include drop tubes, in which fuel samples fall, and larger 
drop towers, in which experiment packages fall. 
course, provide only a few seconds of microgravity conditions. 
gravity exposure times of minutes, sounding rockets with data telemetry have 
been used. A practical compromise in test time against cost is in the use of 
an airplane flying a Keplerian or ballistic flight path. An airplane test 
facility provides microgravity exposures up to 30 sec with the advantages of a 
large volume for experiment packages and the potential for attended testing. 
Empirical combustion studies in microgravity have included burning drop- 
lets, premixed combustion, diffusion flames, and burning of solids. An early 
series of tests of significance to spacecraft fire safety were those conducted 
by Kimzey in a KC-135 airplane (ref. 18). These studies provided photographs 
of flame shapes for plastic samples burning in oxygen and oxygen-enriched air 
under microgravity. Other pioneering low-gravity combustion tests in airplane 
facilities were those reported by Colombo, et al., who illustrated the burning 
of cloth at various atmospheric conditions in microgravity (ref. 24). 
Systems of these types, of 
For longer low- 
Tests conducted in two NASA Lewis drop towers have been the major source 
of microgravity combustion data important for application to fire safety. 
smaller of the two facilities is a tower that provides 2.2 sec of free fall 
through a drop of 24 m. The experiment package, with its combustion chamber, 
gas supply, and camera, is contained within a massive box that acts as a drag 
shield. 
tion force upon falling into an aerated sand pit. 
floats freely within the drag shield during the drop. A description of 'the 
facility and results of first tests were reported by Andracchlo and Aydelott 
(ref. 25). In these tests, the flame spread of ignited cellulose and paper 
specimens in air and oxygen was investigated (refs. 25 and 26). Other perti- 
nent studies in this facility included tests on diffusion flames of hydrogen 
and hydrocarbons stabilized on small tubes to correlate normal and low-gravity 
flame length and radius (refs. 27 to 31). 
The 
Three wood spikes extending below the drag shield absorb the decelera- 
The experiment package 
An example of the results of low-gravity combustion studies is illustrated 
in figure 3. This plot shows measured flame lengths of methane-air diffusion 
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flames as a func t ion  o f  t ime ( r e f .  31). Combustion was i n i t i a t e d  i n  normal ' 
g r a v i t y  ( p r i o r  t o  the  drop). 
then gradua l ly  increased. During most low-grav i ty  tes ts ,  t h e  flame eventua l l y  
a t ta ined  a constant l eng th  comparable t o  the  mean normal-gravity flame length.  
I n  some cases, however, the  flame extinguished p r i o r  t o  achiev ing a sustained 
flame length, as a l s o  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  f i g u r e  3 .  The se l f -ext inguished flame, a 
phenomenon pecu l i a r  t o  micrograv i ty ,  may be the  r e s u l t  o f  accumulated combus- 
t i o n  products impeding the  d i f f us ion  o f  oxygen i n t o  the  flame zone. 
A t  the  drop, t he  flame length  f i r s t  decreased and 
A c o r r e l a t i o n  o f  f lame r a d i i  f o r  t he  same t e s t  ser ies i s  shown i n  
f i g u r e  4. 
time, a rad ius /ve loc l ty  parameter. The more-spherical low-grav i ty  flame i s  
perhaps 50-percent wider than the corre'sponding normal-gravity flame. The 
c o r r e l a t i o n  i s  derived from a reasonable f i t  t o  experimental data, bu t  t he  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  does n o t  ho ld beyond a f u e l  t ime o f  t he  order o f  5 ( low f u e l  
v e l o c i t i e s ) .  
Normal and low-gravity flame r a d i i  a re  compared on a basis o f  f u e l  
The la rge r  drop tower f a c i l i t y  provides a f r e e  f a l l  f o r  5.2 sec through a 
drop of 132 m ( r e f s .  32 and 33). 
13 Pa (100 pm o f  mercury), t o  e l iminate the  need f o r  a drop sh ie ld  around the  
experiment vehic le .  Reported g rav i ta t i ona l  accelerat ions i n  the  f a c i l i t y  a re  
o f  the  order o f  10-59. ( A  "g" i s  the u n i t  o f  normal ear th  g rav i t y ,  9.8 m/sec2.) 
This i s  one t o  three orders o f  magnitude b e t t e r  than m ic rog rav i t i es  achieved 
i n  other  f a c i l i t i e s  and f l i g h t s .  For f i r e - r e l a t e d  studies, t he  f a c i l i t y  was 
f i r s t  used t o  i nves t i ga te  the  f l amnab i l i t y  o f  w i r e  bundles i n  Tef lon s leev ing 
i n  a high-pressure ( s u p e r c r i t i c a l )  l l q u i d  oxygen atmosphere ( r e f .  33) .  These 
t e s t s  were prompted by the  inves t iga t ion  o f  the  Apol lo  13 explosion. Results 
showed t h a t  the  i n s u l a t i o n  burned completely i n  micrograv i ty ;  bu t  the flame 
spread was reduced, compared t o  reference normal-gravity tes ts .  Later s tud ies 
inves t iga ted  the  combustion o f  t h i n  ce l l u lose  acetate sheets i n  s u p e r c r i t i c a l  
l i q u i d  oxygen ( r e f .  26). Again, flame spread was reduced i n  micrograv i ty .  The 
r a t i o  o f  low t o  normal-gravity flame spread was dependent on the  specimen 
thickness, ranging from 0.6 f o r  the  th i ckes t  specimen (0.12 mn) t o  near ly  one 
f o r  t h e  th innes t  (0.025 mn). 
f lame spread based on combustion models and extended i t  t o  t e s t s  i n  oxygen and 
oxygen-inert atmospheres ( r e f .  34). 
The 6.1-m diameter sha f t  i s  evacuated t o  
Continued s tud ies cor re la ted  the  low-grav i ty  
The greatest  per iod  o f  research a c t i v i t y  i n  the  two NASA Lewis drop towers 
was between 1968 and 1975. Recently, there  has been a resumption i n  the use 
of t h e  f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  combustion studies ( r e f .  35).  
The i d e a l  f a c i l i t y  f o r  micrograv i ty  research i s ,  o f  course, an o r b i t i n g  
spacecraft.  
F la rmab i l i t y ,  conducted February 1974 and reported by Kimzey ( r e f s .  1 and 36).  
I n  these experiments, specimens o f  aluminized Mylar, Nylon, polyurethane foam, 
Teflon, and paper were i g n i t e d  i n  a 65-percent-oxygen atmosphere.. The study 
compared burning ra tes  and the  v isual  appearance o f  low-grav i ty  flames w i th  
corresponding measurements i n  normal g rav i t y .  The extinguishment o f  flames by 
vent ing  t o  the  outs ide vacuum of  space was a l so  observed. 
One important t e s t  was the  Skylab Experiment M-479 on Zero Grav i ty  
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Review of Microgravity Combustion Findings 
Ignition energy for cornbustion of practical materials is probably 
unaffected by gravity; however, without natural convection, total incident 
energy to Ignite materials may be reduced. 
low-gravity ignition requirements are the same as those in normal gravity 
(ref. 36). 
fires, a hypothesis based on work in progress. Burning rates of most solid 
materials appear to be lower under microgravity unless forced-convection flows 
are present. 
spherical than conventional, normal-gravity flames. The low-gravity flames 
are more yellow and orange in color than corresponding normal-gravity flames, 
indicating that they are sootier and cooler. 
fluctuations than comparable normal-gravity flames (refs. 25 and 33). Self- 
extinguished flames were observed in microgravity (fig. 3) in some cases, where 
combustion products may impede oxygen diffusion into the flame zone. 
Investigators usually report that 
An exception may be in surface-tension-driven convection in pool 
For diffusion flames, the microgravity flame fronts are more 
The flames show less I1noisel1 and 
Some combustion analyses propose an estimate of low-gravity flame heights 
as intermediate between those of normal gravity and inverted gravity (ref. 37). 
In the diffusion flame experiments discussed by Haggard, however, low-gravity 
flame lengths may approach those of normal gravity (ref. 31). 
While these observations imply that the fire hazards may be reduced in 
microgravity compared to normal gravity, there are other factors that can 
cancel this apparent safety factor. Spacecraft ventilating systems superimpose 
forced convection, which may enhance low-gravity flame spread. Haggard inves- 
tigated diffusion flames in the 2.2-sec drop tower with a diffusion flame tube 
surrounded by an air annulus (ref. 31). Among the results were the findings 
that minimum air flows of 10 cm/sec could prevent methane flame extinguishment 
in microgravity. 
Certain materials (Kimzey observed this with Nylon) (ref. 36) tend to boil 
and scatter when burning in low gravity. Globules o f  hot material, instead of 
falling to the floor, may drift to ignite adjacent surfaces in low gravity. 
Work by S. Olson at NASA Lewis (Technical Memorandum in publication) confirms 
this hazard in observing the dispersion of particles from Nylon Velcro. 
Microgravity flames, while cooler than corresponding normal-gravity 
flames, may be more radiant due to the concentration of soot particles. This 
could increase the dangers of flashovers and fire spread to adjacent surfaces 
through radiant heat transfer. 
Finally, flamnable sprays, particles, or aerosols may persist in micro- 
gravity rather than disperse or settle, Imposing a serious ignition threat 
(ref. 9). Preliminary analyses of particle cloud combustion have been reported 
by Berlad and Joshi (ref. 38), but more fundamental and empirical research on 




State of the art. - Incipient fires can be identified by their signatures, 
or the changes in the environment from a "normal" condition. 
may include pressure rise, temperature rise, particle concentration, thermal 
or visible radiation, chemical species population, and combinations of factors. 
The fire detector must be positioned for effective transport of the signature 
information from the affected areas to the detector and must analyze the signa- 
ture for appropriate action. Rapid activation implies increasing possibilities 
for "false alarms", which are most undesirable. Furthermore, in the enclosed 
space of  the Space Station, the detection of some noncombustion conditions, 
such as overheating, smoldering, and catalytic decomposition is also essential. 
These signatures 
Fire detection devices thus work on the general principles of heat, smoke, 
flame, and particle detection. 
manned spacecraft, fire sensors were unnecessary, and the astronauts functioned 
as detectors. Starting with Skylab, the modules were too complex for reliance 
on human observations. The Skylab detector was a radiometer, sensitive to 
ultraviolet at less than 270 nm, responding to OH radicals generated by a fire 
(ref. 39). This detector was evaluated in microgravity in a KC-135 airplane, 
with a combustion target based on the experiment package of Kimzey and Downs 
(ref. 18). The Shuttle uses nine ionlzation-type detectors (fig. 5). These 
are analogous to comnercial smoke detectors, operating on the principle that 
smoke particles impede the mobility of air ions in a chamber, changing the 
current level to trigger'an alarm. For the Shuttle, forced-air fans at each 
detector provide a flow path to insure the transport of smoke particles to the 
detector (ref. 40). 
In the confined quarters of the earliest U.S. 
Present developments for spacecraft fire sensors include a variety of 
techniques. DeMels mentions infrared detectors for flames and coaxial wire 
detectors for overtemperatures (ref. 1). Recent attention has also been given 
to a condensation nuclei detector, which counts smoke particles by condensed 
water droplets around each particle (ref. 41). The application of this method 
In low gravity is still under evaluation, however. 
Lewis Workshop on Spacecraft Fire Safety is that future fire detection must 
seek lightweight and rapid means. 
detection is important in the complex, multimodule Space Station. 
tive systems will use localized sensing ports for rapid response. 
problems with individual components may be identified by chemical coatings to 
release indicators, a concept in the early stage of development. The connec- 
tion of multiple sensors to central annunciator stations through fiber optics 
appears promising (ref. 42). All of these developments in improved sensors, 
sensor localization, and centralized detector systems is worthy of further 
study. Moreover, additional research is warranted on the identification of 
fire signatures of spacecraft materials in the microgravity environment. 
WorkshoD recommendations. - The consensus of participants in the NASA 





State of the art. - Fires are extinguished through several physical and 
chemical means. The burning material may be disturbed or removed, the oxidant 
inerted, the reaction cooled, or the reaction chemically inhibited. 
extinguishers operate through each or several of these modes. For example, 
sand buckets disturb the burning material, carbon dioxide blankets the fire 
excluding oxygen, water cools the reaction, and halogenated hydrocarbons 
tnhlbtt the cornbustion reaction. 
Fire 
The Hercury and Gemini spacecraft had water available, but they had no 
systems dedicated solely for fire extinguishing. 
hand-held fire extinguisher, which contained water and a cellulose gel to form 
a foam when sprayed (ref. 43). The 100-percent-oxygen atmosphere of the early 
spacecraft aggravated the flamnability of most materials, and tests showed that 
water was the only effective extingulshant (ref. 9). In the more conventional 
atmospheres of recent spacecraft, halogenated hydrocarbon fire extinguishers 
are used. For the Shuttle (fig. 5), there are both fixed and portable fire 
extinguishers. Important features in the Shuttle cabin are ports in the 
instrument panels to insert the portable fire extinguisher nozzles when neces- 
sary to control deep-seated fires. 
The Apollo spacecraft had a 
The use of halogenerated hydrocarbon (Halon) fire extinguishers in the 
Shuttle is based on favorable experience in the history of the application of 
these extinguishers to aircraft (ref. 44). 
class of fire extinguishing agents was the subject of a 1972 symposium (ref. 45). 
The most widely used compound is Halon 1301 (bromotrlfluoromethane, CFsBr), 
although Halon 1211 (chlorobromodifluoromethane, CF2BrCl) is available on 
some aircraft, especially in Europe. The principal active specie in Halon 1301 
i s  bromine, which, as an ion, reacts with the OH radical to stop the combustion 
chain reaction. Halon 1301 is a most effective extinguishant in volume concen- 
tration to 6 percent (refs. 46 and 47). The negative aspect of the use of 
Halon 1301 is the toxicity and corrosiveness of the halogen acids, HBr and HF, 
formed as decomposition products. In open spaces, these products may be easily 
dispersed, but in a spacecraft, atmospheric contamination after even minor 
fires is a great concern. The agent itself, when leaked or discharged (it is 
a gas at normal conditions), can also be toxic (ref. 48). 
A comprehensive review of this 
A recent article (ref. 1) recomnends deionized water as an alternative 
extinguishant for the Space Station. 
uninhabited (electrical cabinets, for example) can be inerted, using nitrogen. 
The venting of a portion of the spacecraft to fight difficult fires is another 
interesting measure. Kimzey, in an unpublished memorandum, noted that, in the 
Space Station, the crew can abandon a module, which then can be depressurized 
slowly to extinguish the fire. Upon repressurization, the atmosphere could 
then be sampled for residual combustion and extinguishant products before 
reboarding. 
Areas of the Space Station that are 
Workshop recomnendations. - The consensus of participants in the NASA 
Workshop on Spacecraft Fire Safety is that increased efforts should be made in 
the technology development of systems, such as deionized water, which, while 
innovative in application, are proven in concept. Again, further studies of 
the pecularities of flame propagation and extinguishment in low gravity are 
highly recommended. Recent work by Ronney (ref. 35) in the NASA Lewis 2.2-sec 
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, drop tower studied the change in lean flamnability limits of diffusion flames 
doped with- small quantities of Halon 1301. 
guishment in spacecraft would also benefit from reviews of analogous tech- 
niques, based on experience with aircraft and submarines (ref. 49). 
Potential Improvements in extin- 
Materials Assessment 
State of the art. - One expects that, from the start, materials for 
Inclusion on human-crew spacecraft would be strictly controlled. 
100-percent-oxygen atmosphere of the early spacecraft created a hazardous 
situation in which few materials, even metals, are truly nonflamble. The 
stringent materials requirements acted as' a catalyst for the creative tnvention 
' and development of 'space ageY materials. The 1971 Conference on Materials for 
Improved Fire Safety (ref. 14) was a forum for the review of the progress at 
that time In nonmetallic structural materials, foams, and insulations, as well 
as in the new flamnablllty testlng and acceptance procedures. 
screening involves the verification of the acceptability of the bulk material 
followed by qualification testing in specific conflgurations. 
tests adapted for spacecraft, as described in the early reviews (refs. 13 and 
.43), included conventional flash point tests as we91 as un'ique upward propaga- 
tion, downward propagation, drip ignition, short-circuit ignition, and auto- 
ignition tests. 
Current spacecraft have less hazardous sea-level air atmospheres, but fire 
safety measures through materials control are still imperative. At present, 
NASA imposes the flammabilty and off-gassing requirements of the NHB 8060.16 
handbook (ref. 17) in addition to other documented specificatlons on strength, 
corrosion resistance, and vacuum permeability.. Material control procedures are 




The long-duration habitation and the wide range of living and working 
activities in the Space Station will expand the range of materials on board. 
Not only must inventoried materials be considered, but also extraneous items 
or contraband. Papers, books, films, recreational items, nonissue clothing 
items, and souvenirs will be brought on board. Secured, fire-resistant storage 
areas for personal items may be the only practical approach. Again, an analogy 
may be pursued in terms of similar problems with flamnable items, trash, and 
waste in airplane cabins (ref. 50). 
The aim of present day flammability testing is to provide useful measure- 
ments that can be interpreted on the basis of the underlying chemical and 
physical principles. Material tests, of necessity, are usually on small-scale 
samples. The tests serve to predict full-scale behavior to guide the ultimate 
quality assurance using, as far as possible, standardized methods and proce- 
dures. Hilado has assessed various fire response test methods for suitability 
in screening aerospace materials (ref. 51). One recomnended method, shown in 
figure 8, tests the behavior of a 150 by 150 mm specimen under variable thermal 
exposures. This method, called'the OSU calorimeter, is now standardized as 
ASTM €906-83 (ref. 52). The advantage of the use of standardized industry 
methods for fire safety is the opportunity to generalize techniques with preci- 
sion limits determined from Interlaboratory cooperative testing. For the Space 
Station, expansion of the NASA methods of NHB 8060.18 to include the general- 
ized procedures will assist users by allowing more s+mplified and convenient 
screening of research and housekeeping materials. 
1 1  
WorkshoD recommendations. - The consensus of participants in the NASA Fire ' Safety Workshop is that advancements and updating of material testing methods 
and standards are necessary. 
demands attention to time-related testing, to allow for deterioration and aging 
of materials, for example. 
discussed, makes specialized testing necessary, including methods appropriate 
to determine spontaneous ignition and low-temperature combustion (smoldering). 
The latter phenomenon is apt to occur particularly with the many foamed mate- 
rials used today. 
~ 
The long-duration operation of the Space Station 
The unique low-gravity environment, as already 
. .  
Spacecraft Atmospheres 
State of the art. - Simplicity of controls and the confidence of ground 
experience would seem to favor the retention of a sea-level oxygen-nitrogen 
atmosphere in spacecraft. Nevertheless, research has shown that alternative 
atmospheres can have advantages for fire safety. The practicality of these 
atmospheric systems for introduction into the Space Station is still unknown, 
but the concepts are worthy of'further study and development. 
An atmosphere that inhibits combustion may, on the contrary, support human 
life. Sea-level air contains 21 mole (volume) percent oxygen, corresponding 
to a standard partial pressure of 21.2 kPa. Table I11 shows standard atmos- 
pheric values at several altitudes (ref. 53). On the ground, humans can 
acclimate in permanent settlements at altitudes at least as high as 2400 m 
(8000 ft). Thus, human activities are feasible over a range of atmospheric 
pressures from below 74 to 100 percent of sea level, corresponding to oxygen 
partial pressures of 16 to 21 kPa. The amount of nitrogen or, within limits, 
the total pressure of the atmosphere is immaterial for human sustenance. For 
combustion, on the other hand, an atmosphere is required with a minimum concen- 
tration, or mole percent, of oxygen. The presence of nitrogen affects combus- 
tion because combustion energy is used to heat the inert atmosphere, cooling 
and possibly quenching the flame. In fact, the sensitivity of combustion to 
the oxygen fraction of the atmosphere is the basis for the oxygen index test, 
a method to determine the flammability of materials through the minimum percent 
oxygen necessary to sustain combustion (generalized as ASTM 02863-77) (refs. 54 
and 55). 
As a consequence to these differences in atmospheric effects, it is 
evident that atmospheres with partial pressures acceptable for humans, but with 
reduced mole fractions of oxygen, can reduce fire hazards in spacecraft. This 
use of modified spacecraft atmosphere had been proposed about 20 years ago 
based on simple flame-spread tests (ref. 56). A further application of this 
principle is in nitrogen flooding as a fire fighting measure, already suggested 
for submarines by Carhart (ref. 49). In this procedure, nitrogen is used to 
Increase the total pressure to suppress fires by lowering oxygen concentration. 
This atmosphere retains the original oxygen partial pressure. 
An alternative to reduced-oxygen atmospheres for fire safety Is one with 
other than nitrogen as the inert constituent. Helium, which is used, for 
example, as the diluent in diving atmospheres, appears to inhibit ignition 
(ref. 57). Once fires occur, however, helium, which has a low specific heat 
per mole, promotes fire spread. In fact, of the common elemental gases, nitro- 
gen has the most favorable inhibition properties. Studies by McHale (ref. 58) 
12 
I 
and Huggett ( r e f .  59) have proposed the s u b s t i t u t i o n  o f  f l u o r i n a t e d  hydro- 
carbons, such as carbon te t ra f l uo r ide ,  CF4, which have h igh  molar s p e c i f i c  
heats, f o r  a t  l e a s t  p a r t  o f  t he  ni t rogen i n  a f i r e - s a f e  atmosphere. 
f l u o r i n a t e d  hydrocarbons no t  on ly  suppress flame spread by t h e i r  h igh  s p e c i f i c  
heat, bu t  can produce r e a c t i o n - i n h l b l t i n g  species analogous t o  the a c t i o n  of 
, Halon 1301 ext inguishant.  These halogenated gases appear t o  be p h y s i o l o g i c a l l y  
i n e r t ,  bu t  confidence i n  t h e i r  usage must be demonstrated by long-term t e s t i n g .  
The 
UorkshoD recomnendations. - The p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  the  NASA Spacecraft F i r e  
Safety Workshop proposed th ree  a l t e r n a t i v e  spacecraf t  atmospheres, judged t o  
be f i r e  safe, f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  i nves t i ga t i on  and technology development. These 
atmospheres, i n  t h e  p r i o r i t y . g i v e n ,  are: 
(1) 150 kPa t o t a l  pressure (1.5 atm), 1 2  mole percent oxygen; 
(2)  100 kPa t o t a l  pressure (1.0 atm), and minimum oxygen concentrat ion; 
( 3 )  Atmospheres w i t h  d i l u e n t s  other than ni t rogen. 
The f i r s t  recomnendation i s  an atmosphere t h a t  r e t a i n s  the  sea-level 
p a r t i a l  pressure of oxygen. The mole percent o f  oxygen, however, i s  low enough 
t h a t  f i r e  hazards should be g r e a t l y  reduced. 
pressure may c a l l  f o r  more complex and heavier spacecraf t  s t ruc tu res .  
second recomnendatlon avoids t h i s  total-pressure d i f f i c u l t y .  
mole f r a c t i o n  o f  16 percent would correspond t o  standard ea r th  condi t ions a t  
2200 m (7200 f t )  a l t i t u d e  (Table 111). This reduced p a r t i a l  pressure o f  oxygen 
f o r  t h e  Space S t a t i o n  i s  one o f  the  options presented i n  a paper by Grieder 
( r e f .  60). The t h i r d  recomnendation i s  a consequence o f  studies such as those 
o f  McHale ( r e f .  58) and Huggett ( r e f .  59). These s u b s t i t u t e  atmospheres pre; 
sent t h e  most innovat ive  approach, but they are  probably the  l e a s t  f eas ib le .  
Unfortunately,  t he  higher t o t a l  
The 
A minimum oxygen 
HUMAN FACTORS 
Combustion Product T o x i c i t y  
It i s  w e l l  establ ished t h a t  the p r i n c i p a l  danger t o  humans i n  f i r e s  i s  t he  
t o x i c  and asphyxiat ing combustion products, more than the  heat o f  combustion 
( r e f .  61). Carbon monoxide i s  the  p r i n c i p a l  t o x i c  compound found i n  smoke, 
al though burning wood and p l a s t i c s  can generate hydrogen cyanide, hydrogen 
ch lo r i de ,  acro le in ,  and other t o x i c  gases. 
t o x i c ,  bu t  i t s  presence i n  smoke can exclude oxygen, and i t  may have syner- 
g i s t i c  e f f e c t s  i n  increasing carbon monoxide t o x i c i t y  ( r e f .  62). Pa r t i cu la tes  
i n  smoke a l so  con t r i bu te  t o  reduced v i s i b i l i t y ,  a danger i n  impeding escape. 
Carbon d iox ide  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  non- 
Chemical and b i o l o g i c a l  techniques e x i s t  f o r  the  assessment o f  t he  flam- 
m a b i l i t y  hazards o f  present spacecraft ma te r ia l s  ( r e f s .  51 and 63). The evolu- 
t i o n  and d ispers ion  of t o x i c  products o f  combustion, however, depend on many 
phys ica l  f ac to rs  i n  the  spacecraft i n s t a l l a t i o n .  The low-gravi ty environment 
may c o n t r i b u t e  t o  toxic-gas generatlon. D i f fus ion- f lame observations show t h a t  
low-grav i ty  combustion I s  o f t e n  incomplete, wi th e q u i l i b r i u m  products favo r ing  
carbon monoxide. Cleanup and removal o f  the  t o x i c  products i n  spacecraft may 
be d i f f i c u l t ,  and contaminants are o f ten  d e t e c t i b l e  w i t h  g rea t  p rec is ion .  
Hence, zero exposure cannot be expected, and permiss ib le  long-durat ion l i m i t s  
must be establ ished f o r  p r a c t i c a l i t y .  
o l d  t e s t s  and s t a t i s t i c a l  analyses and should be updated. 
E x i s t i n g  standards are  o f t e n  based on 
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As noted in a previous section, the extinguishment of fires can add con- 
taminants to the spacecraft atmosphere. 
acceptable current extinguishant I is known to generate halogen acids when 
heated. For spacecraft, there has been no actual experience in the aftermath 
of extinguisher use, and the authors are not aware of any occasion when extin- 
guishers have been discharged in orbitlng spacecraft. In the future, however, 
there is likelihood that in the long life of the Space Station, minor or incip- 
lent fires will require attention to the use of extinguishers and clean up of 
residues. 
Specifically, Halon 1301, while the 
Submarine and Aircraft Experience 
Physical and biological stresses and hazards in a spacecraft are similar 
in many respects to those present in submarines and aircraft. The closed 
environment in the submarine provides a useful model for atmospheric control 
and contaminant removal (ref. 64). Modern submarines have provisions for 
oxygen makeup from water hydrolysis, venting the hydrogen (ref. 49). They also 
have elaborate scrubbing, absorption, and precipitation equipment to remove 
atmospheric contaminants, including toxic and flammable gases. On the other 
hand, the environment in the submarine is normal gravity and the external pres- 
sure is high, causing inward leakage if the shell is damaged. Spacecraft con- 
taminant removal I s  more difficult, if for no other reason than operations are 
under microgravity. 
The Special Aviation Fire and Explosion Reduction (SAFER) Advisory Commit- 
tee Report includes a number of recommendations that certainly apply to space- 
craft as well as to aircraft (ref. 65). In brief, pertinent sections of the 
report refer to toxic and smoke hazardsI chemical product detection, animal 
testing, toxicity standards, and material ratings. 
Recommendations 
The NASA Spacecraft Fire Safety Workshop included a discusslon forum on 
human responses to combustion products and inert atmospheres. The participants 
urged continued study on combustion and extinguishment in microgravity for 
prediction of toxic-product generation. While microgravity may not influence 
the equilibrium chemical reactions of combustion and pyrolysis, it can affect 
that mass and energy transfer into the atmosphere. Acceptance of many mate- 
rials can be based on the potential generation of toxic combustion products, 
as well as on flammability. Further blological testing is certainly necessary 
to determine acceptable exposure levels for the long-duration exposure expected 
in the Space Station. 
based on extrapolation of limited animal tests. 
Present data are often marginally adequate and usually 
The Space Station crew will be composed of persons of differing experience 
and skills. Although adequate fire-control instructions will be part of the 
advance training for the crew, the workshop participants recomnended special- 
ized training for at least one crew member on duty. 
marshal1 will be responsible for the enforcement of fire safety regulations and 
for the direction of fire fighting and evacuation, if ever necessary. 
This designated fire 
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APPLICATION TO THE SPACE STATION 
Initial Operating Condition 
Because of the long lead time for design, development, fabrication, and 
testing, safety philosophies and most procedures have already been determined 
for the initial configuration of the Space Station. 
Condition has established requirements based on the experience of past space 
missions. Certain of the ground rules for fire safety are paraphrased here, 
selected from items in the comprehensive list of crew safety criteria published 
by Percy, et al. (ref. 66). 
The Initial Operating 
(1) No credib 
potential for crew 
(2) No credib 
Space Station. 
(3) The Space 
1 solated. 
e combination of two errors or failures shall result in the 
injury or loss of the Space Station. 
e single error or failure shall result in damage to the 
Station shall be designed so that any damaged module can be 
. (4) Any volume shall be capable of sustaining the whole crew, providing a 
safe haven. 
(5) Atmospheric stores capability shall be sufficient for two full repres- 
(6) Real time monitoring of the atmosphere constituents shall be 
surizations of each habitable module. 
performed. 
(7) Provision shall be made for the detection, handling, and containment 
o f  toxic and flammable materlals. 
(8) Primary structural materials shall be nonflamnable. 
(9) Normally-exposed nonmetallic materials shall be self-extinguishing in 
the most severe oxidizing environment, and means shall be provided for fire- 
proof storage of nonself-extinguishing materials when they are not in use. 
(10) All personal items shall be screened for flammability and toxicity. 
The strict criteria inherent i n  the Initial Operating Condition do not 
imply that there is no opportunity for inclusion of advanced fire-safety con- 
trols in the initial Space Station. An important guideline for the Space 
Station is in the accommodation of science and industrial operations. The 
Space Station is to serve its users, not its designers (ref. 67). Hence, 
established fire-control procedures are open to modification if the changes can 
promote the usefulness and application of the missions, without compromising 
the safety criteria. 
Until feasibility of an alternative fire-safe atmosphere t s  demonstrated, the 
obvious atmosphere i n  the Space Station must be sea-level air, 21-mole-percent 
oxygen. For extravehicular activities, the mobility of space suit hand joints 
The atmosphere in the Space Station habitation modules merits comment. 
1.5 
limits the total pressure in the suit to about 30 kPa (4.3 psia), maintained 
by a 100-percent-oxygen atmosphere. In order to precondition the astronauts 
to avoid nitrogen bubbles in the body tissues caused by the sudden pressure 
change, the module atmosphere is reduced to 70 kPa for 12 to 24 hr prior to the 
activity. This creates a temporary enriched atmosphere of 30 percent oxygen. 
A hard suit operating at 55 kPa (8 psla) total pressure, which Is a low enough 
pressure differential to eliminate the need for preconditioning, is presently 
under study (ref. 68). 
Space Station as a Test Facility 
Without a doubt, there will be growth versions of the Space Station beyond 
For furthering the prevention, detection, and control of fires, 
the Initial Operating Condition. Accordingly, the Space Station itself, or 
free-flying platforms associated with the Space Station, offers potential as a 
test facility. 
many studies can use the Space Station to advantage. The long-term micrograv- 
ity environment allows research and development on basic combustion, atmo- 
spheres, sensors, materials, and other concerns. Detached volumes can also 
provide for large-scale research to validate scaling theories. 
The access of a wide variety of users to the Space Station will be aided 
by the adoption of generalized fire standards. Standards are based on a con- 
sensus of design and evaluation. Again, the Space Station can be employed as 
a test facility for interlaboratory comparisons to determine precision and 
bias. 
standards. As examples, ASTM standards F501-84 "Test Method for Aerospace 
Materials Response, with Vertical Test Specimensuu, and F777-82, "Test Method 
for Resistance of Electrical Wire Insulation Materials to Flame at 60°uu, 
(ref. 69) are definitive and standardized versions of comparable methods in the 
NHB 8060.16 handbook (ref. 17). 
There is already a trend toward the formulation of aerospace fire safety 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Current fire safety criteria are adequate and effective for present space- 
craft. For the Space Station, a permanently-inhabited orbiting laboratory, the 
long-duration missions may call for improved and innovatlve fire-control tech- 
niques. Conversely, the proposed accessibility of the Space Station to a 
variety of users may call for less restrictive and less costly measures. This 
paper discusses fire safety issues through a review of the state of the art and 
a presentation of key findings from a recent NASA Lewis workshop. 
of interest to flre safety include the science of microgravity combustion; the 
applications to fire detection, extinguishment, materials assessment, and 
spacecraft atmosphere selection; and the implications for human responses to 
atmospheres and contaminants. 
The issues 
.Two fire-safety questions that stimulated the expansion of fire safety 
inquiries toward Space Statlon application still remain to be resolved. 
are, in brief: 
These 
(1) How to reduce the hazards of the oxygen-enriched atmosphere prior to 
extravehicular activities, and 
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' e x t i n g  
How t o  reduce .,,e t o x i c  hazard o 
shant, Halon 1301. 
the  cu r ren t  and most e f f e c t i v e  
The r e s u l t s  o f  t h i s  review po in t  t o  the  necess i ty  f o r  continued research 
i n  combustion fundamentals under mic rograv i ty  and continued technology develop- 
ment i n t o  f i r e  detect ion,  f i r e  contro l ,  innovat ive  ma te r ia l s  and tes t i ng ,  and 
a l t e r n a t i v e  f i r e - s a f e  atmospheres. A g rea ter  r e l i a n c e  on genera l ized standards 
would be most valuable. 
and t h e  cooperation w i t h  government and i n d u s t r i a l  sources o f  f i r e - s a f e t y  
knowledge. 
This would be aided by the  review o f  e x i s t i n g  s tud ies 
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Notes: a. Oxygen p a r t i a l  pressure ca lcu la ted  a t  geopoten t ia l  
a l t i t u d e s  shown based on i n v a r i a n t  composition o f  
0.2094 mole (volume) percent o f  oxygen.52 
b. P r a c t i c a l  minimum oxygen p a r t i a l  pressure 
corresponding t o  ea r th  a l t i t u d e  and comnerical 
f l i g h t  acc l imat iza t ion .  
100 percent oxygen. 
c. Present space s u i t  pressure, suppl ied w i t h  
d. Proposed f u t u r e  space s u i t  pressure. Oxygen 
content could range from 29 mole percent (b  l i m i t )  
t o  38 mole percent (sea l e v e l  p a r t i a l  pressure). 
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